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 A structural approach to estimating the e®ect of taxation on the
labor market dynamics of older workers¤
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Abstract
We estimate a dynamic structural life-cycle model of employment, non-employment and
retirement that includes endogenous accumulation of human capital and intertemporal non-
separabilities in preferences. Additionally, the model accounts for the e®ect of the tax and
transfer system on work incentives. The structural parameter estimates are used to evaluate
the e®ects of a tax reform targeted at low income individuals on employment behavior and
retirement decisions.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze how the labor market behavior of older individuals responds
to the incentives provided by the tax and transfer system. Given our analysis, it is appropriate
to work within a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply. A dynamic model is
required to take account of intertemporal non-separabilities in wages and preferences. Such
e®ects imply that reforms of the tax system which a®ect the net incomes of young or middle
aged individuals might induce incentives which change employment behavior towards the end of
the working life. Similarly, a life-cycle model, featuring optimizing forward looking individuals,
provides a desirable framework as it allows current labor supply to depend on the expected
rewards to future employment. Thus, a life-cycle model captures the employment response of
younger members of the labor force to a tax reform that a®ects the net incomes of older workers.
In common with the proceeding literature concerned with the speci¯cation and estimation of
dynamic structural life-cycle models of labor supply, prominently Eckstein and Wolpin (1989),
our model allows for on-the-job accumulation of human capital and for intertemporally non-
separable preferences. Additionally, the implemented model captures the e®ects of income taxa-
tion, social security contributions and in-work and out-of-work transfers on labor supply incen-
tives. The latter feature is necessary to represent correctly labor supply incentives. Despite this,
very few papers in this literature have attempted to model the returns to working as net income
rather than gross earnings. Indeed, while there exist several implementations of dynamic struc-
tural life-cycle models including a speci¯cation of the transfers paid to non-working individuals
(see, inter alia, Adda, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Sianesi, 2007; Ferrall, 1997; Wolpin, 1992), the
tax and transfer system applicable to the gross incomes of working individuals has been widely
ignored. Exceptions include Yamada (2007), who models progressive income tax when analyzing
the life-cycle employment behavior of Japanese women, Haan, Prowse, and Uhlendor® (2008)
who use a full speci¯cation of all relevant elements of the German tax and transfer system when
studying the e®ect of in-work bene¯ts and Rust and Phelan (1997) who study the e®ect of the
design of the social security system on the retirement decisions of American men.
In our framework, the transfer system determines the net incomes of non-working individuals
through means-tested bene¯ts while the net income of a working individual is de¯ned as his or her
gross earnings minus social security contributions and income tax plus any in-work transfers. The
novelty of the current paper lies in the focus on the e®ect of the design of the system of taxation
applied to earned income on the employment and retirement decision of older individuals. For
this analysis we use a sample of German men and women aged between 40 and 65 years living in
single adult households without dependent children. Each period non-retired individuals choose
between full-time employment, non-employment and, if eligible, early retirement. In a similar
vein to Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2006), dependent on age and health status, individuals
can decide to retire before the compulsory retirement age of 65 years. In particular, individuals
without health problems can enter retirement if they are aged 50 years or more while individuals
with health problems can retire at any age.
The estimated structural parameters are used to derive the employment and retirement
1e®ects of a reform to the system of income taxation. Speci¯cally we look at the employment
and retirement e®ects of a hypothetical policy change which reduces the taxable earnings of
low income individuals. We compare the e®ect of this policy when individuals of all ages are
a®ected with the e®ect when only those aged 60 years and above receive the reduction in taxable
income. This analysis complements a large empirical literature which has evaluated the labor
supply e®ects of policies that alter the net incomes of working individuals with low earning,
prominently the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Working Tax Credit, (see the surveys by
Blank, 2002; Blundell, 2000; Hotz and Scholz, 2003). In contrast to the reduced form and
structural myopic methods of evaluation which have been used previously, we use a dynamic
structural life-cycle model to determine the employment and retirement e®ects of a reform
a®ecting the net incomes of working individuals. The main advantage of our approach is that
the estimated structural parameters can be used to simulate the life-cycle e®ects of proposed
or hypothetical reforms to tax and transfer schemes that a®ect the net incomes of working
individuals while recognizing the forward looking and intertemporal nature of individuals' labor
supply behavior.
The results show that a reduction in the taxable income of low earning individuals at all ages
leads to a signi¯cant increase in employment, of around 1.5 percentage points on average, at most
ages. The vast majority of the increase in employment is due to a reduction in non-employment,
however for individuals aged over 60 years there is, averaged over the sample, a reduction in
retirement, corresponding to a delay in the timing of movements into early retirement. The
policy e®ects are, however, somewhat di®erent when the tax reform is limited to only those aged
60 years and above. Indeed, since we model the labor supply in a dynamic setting with forward
looking individuals, the employment behavior of younger individuals might be a®ected as they
know that if their future earnings are su±ciently low they will receive the reduction in taxable
income once they reach 60 years of age. The results show that the age dependent reform induces
essentially no e®ects for individuals aged under 57 years. However, between age 57 and 60 years
there is an increase in employment and a reduction in non-employment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic structural
model of labor supply behavior over the life-cycle. This section closes with a presentation of the
empirical speci¯cation of the °ow utilities and the equation of motion for gross wages. Section 3
contains a full description of the institutional features of the German tax and transfer system
that impact in the net incomes of employed and non-employed individuals. The strategy for
estimation is outlined in Section 4 and the data source, the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), and our sample selection criteria are discussed in Section 5. Estimation results and an
analysis of goodness of ¯t are presented in Section 6. Section 7 shows the estimated employment
and retirement e®ects of changes to the system of income taxation. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
22 Model and Empirical Speci¯cation
Overview
It is the purpose of this paper to study the e®ects of the tax and transfer system on the employ-
ment behavior of older individuals. To this end, we derive and estimate a dynamic structural
life-cycle model of employment, non-employment and early retirement that accounts for the
endogeneity of work experience, intertemporally non-separable preferences, and the e®ect of the
tax and transfer system on work incentives. To reduce complexities, we restrict our sample to
one particular population group. Speci¯cally, we model only the life-cycle labor supply of men
and women residing in single adult households without dependent children. Further, we focus
on individuals aged 40 years and above. We assume that family composition is constant over the
individual's future life and this is justi¯ed by the aforementioned age restriction. Additionally, it
is assumed that men and women in this age category have ¯nished their education and therefore
all of the analysis is conditional on educational quali¯cations obtained prior to age 40 years.
Before proceeding, two further limitations of our analysis are discussed. Firstly, as is common
in this literature, for example Rust and Phelan (1997), we make the restrictive assumption that
individuals do not save and are credit constrained.1 Secondly, unlike numerous studies focussing
on the job search behavior, including Ferrall (1997) and Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006),
we do not model job search; in our model, all non-retired individuals receive one job o®er
each period and all non-work among non-retired individuals, henceforth referred to as non-
employment, corresponds to individuals who chose not to accept a job at the wage they were
o®ered.
Job O®ers and Net Income
Let t = ¿i denote the age at which individual i enters the labor market and let T denote the age of
compulsory retirement. Similar to Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2006) we allow individuals aged
TR years or older and those with poor health to take early retirement while this alternative is not
open to individuals without health problems aged under TR years. Non-employed individuals
remain in the labor force and may return to full-time employment in the future. In contrast,
early retirement is a fully absorbing state and thus once an individual enters early retirement
returning to employment in the future is precluded.2
In each period t = ¿i;:::;T every non-retired individual receives a single o®er of a full-
time job (f). The gross wage associated with the job o®er received by individual i at time t
is denoted wi;t. Non-retired individuals without health problems aged younger than TR must
decide between accepting the full-time job, in which case they receive a net income in the current
quarter of mi;f;t, and rejecting the o®er, in which case the individual is non-employed (n) and
receives a net income of mi;n;t. Individuals without health problems aged TR or above and all
1French (2005) is one of the few examples of a discrete choice model of life-cycle labor supply that allows
saving.
2This assumption is in line with the observed behavior of early-retired individuals in Germany. Hardly any of
the early-retired transition into full-time employment.
3individuals with health problems have a choice between full-time employment, non-employment,
and retirement (r). In practice, retired individuals receive a pension which depends previous
earnings and working history. We model pension payments in a reduced form manor as discussed
in more detail below. A period is de¯ned to be a quarter of a year. This provides a reasonable
tradeo® between the reality of individuals being able to move between employment states on a
monthly or even weekly basis and the need for computational tractability.
In contrast to most previous studies of employment behavior over the life-cycle, we model in
detail the e®ect of the tax and transfer system on labor supply incentives. This study uses the
German tax and transfer system as a benchmark. Under the German system the net income of
an employed individual is a function of the individual's gross earnings, gross non-labor income
and the prevailing tax and transfer system. The tax and transfer system includes social security
contributions, income taxation and, if net income is su±ciently low, a minimum income transfer
to raise the individual's net income to the minimum income. The net income of a non-employed
individual consists of any non-labor income, which may be taxed, and government provided
transfers. Section 3 provides a more detailed description of the German legislation together
with information concerning relevant recent changes to the system.3
Optimal Labor Supply over the Life-cycle
Having received a job o®er with a wage of wi;t at time t individual i must decide whether to ac-
cept or reject the job o®er. By drawing on dynamic programming techniques, we model optimal
labor supply over the life-cycle in a forward looking setting where the individual considers the
dependence of payo®s occurring in the future on his or her current labor supply decision. We
di®erentiate two mechanisms linking today's employment decision with future payo®s. Firstly,
intertemporally non-separable preferences due to habit formation and adjustment costs mean
that an individual's current employment behavior a®ects his or her preference for employment
relative to non-employment in future periods. Secondly, employment today adds to the indi-
vidual's experience which leads to a higher expected pension and, assuming positive returns to
experience, to higher expected future wage o®ers.
The individual's life-cycle utility can be expressed in terms of the employment state speci¯c
value functions V
j
t (si;t) for j = f;n;r. The state variables si;t consist of all variables a®ecting
the contemporaneous utilities and the o®ered wage wi;t at time t. At time t, the individual is
assumed to know the current value of si;t but may not know the values of all or some elements
of si;t+k for k > 0. However, the distribution of si;t+1 is known to the individual at time t and
it is assumed to depend only on si;t. The value function associated with full-time employment
is de¯ned as discounted value of the individual's expected life-time utility if he or she works
full-time in the current quarter and makes optimal labor supply and retirement decisions in all
subsequent quarters. The value function for non-employment is similarly de¯ned. The value
function associated with early retirement is de¯ned as the discounted value of the individual's
3As mentioned above, we restrict attention to single adult households without children. This simpli¯es greatly
the modeling of the tax and transfer system as the family components of the legislation, such as the joint tax of
married couples, do not need to be considered.
4expected life-time utility if he or she enters retirement in the current quarter.
Formally, let Di;t be an indicator of individual i being eligible for early retirement at age
t. Di;t takes the value one if the individual is aged TR years or above and/or the individual
has health problems and is zero otherwise. The employment state speci¯c value functions for
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In the above yi;j;t for j = f;n;r is an indicator variable taking the value one if the individual
was in employment state j at time t and zero otherwise and T > T denotes the last period
of the individual's life. In the empirical analysis the value of T is taken to be 78 years. Ui;j;t
denotes the individual's °ow utility associated with employment state j at time t and is a
function of the individual's current net income, socio-economic characteristics and his or her
previous employment outcomes. ± denotes the discount factor. This is a crucial parameter in
the life-cycle optimization problem, as it describes how strongly expected future utility a®ects
the individual's current choice. In the empirical analysis we follow the literature and assume an
annualized discount factor of 0.96.4
The individual maximizes life-cycle utility subject a budget constraint. Since in our frame-
work individuals neither save nor borrow, the budget for consumption equals state speci¯c net
income. Optimizing behavior on the part of an individual without health problems implies ac-
ceptance of the job o®er received at time t < TR if and only if V
f





i;t(si;t) then the individual will choose non-employment. A healthy individual
aged TR
i · t < T or an individual with health problem aged t < T will work full-time if
and only if V
f
i;t(si;t) ¸ V n
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i;t(si;t), and otherwise the individual will move out of the
labor market and into retirement. At age t = T all remaining non-retired individuals enter
compulsory retirement.
Empirical speci¯cation
This section contains descriptions of the chosen speci¯cation of the °ow utilities, the distribution
of o®ered wages and the treatment of the persistent unobservables, which takes into account the
initial conditions problem.
4Previous studies, for example Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson (2004), mention problems estimating the
discount factor in similar life-cycle models.
5Flow utilities
For the estimation, the °ow utilities from full-time work and non-employment are speci¯ed as
follows












As common in this literature we assume that individuals are risk averse, and set ½ = 1:5. ¯y
determines the sign and magnitude of the preference for net income and therefore consumption.
The intercept for full-time employment, denoted ¯f, accounts for any disutility from work.
The vector of observed individual characteristics xi;t includes an indicator of the individual's
employment state in the last quarter, and individual's total labor market experience since leaving
full-time education, measured in quarters, in addition to socio-economic variables. The lagged
employment state and experience terms capture intertemporal non-separabilities in preferences
due to the combined e®ects of habit formation and adjustment costs. The unobservables ²i;f;t
and ²i;n;t are assumed to be mutually independent and independent over time. Additionally, ²i;j;t
for all i, j and t is assumed to have a type I extreme value distribution. At time t individual
i knows the current values of ²i;f;t and ²i;n;t but has no information about the future values of
these error terms.
Persistence in unobservables is captured by ®ie which represents a time invariant individual
speci¯c random e®ect, assumed to be known to the individual but unobserved to the econometri-
cian. ®ie is assumed to occur independently of observed socio-economic characteristics, however,
by construction, at t > ¿i ®ie will be correlated with experience and the individual's previous
employment state. Therefore, an initial conditions problem is encountered with estimating this
model because individuals are ¯rst sampled after they have entered the labor market. We follow
Wooldridge (2005) and model the distribution of the random e®ect conditional on the initial
conditions. This is operationalized by allowing the mean of the random e®ect appearing in
preferences to depend on the ¯rst observation of the individual's employment status and the
proportion of the individual's working life spend in employment at the point when the indi-
vidual enters the sample. The stochastic element of the random e®ect is drawn from a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance ¾2
®e.5
A reduced form speci¯cation of the value function for retirement V r
t (si;t) is employed. Specif-
ically we assume
V r
t (si;t) = °qi;t
T X
h=0
±h + ²i;r;t; (5)
where ²i;r;t is an error term with the same properties as ²i;j;t for j = f;n. In the above °qi;t
can be interpreted as the deterministic component of the per-period utility of an individual who
5In order to obtain identi¯cation, the coe±cients of the observed and unobserved individual characteristics xi;t
and ®i have been normalized to zero in the °ow utility from non-employment.
6enters retirement at age t, relative to his or her utility from non-employment. The value function
for retirement is formed by summing the discounted per period utilities over the individual's
remaining life. In the above, qi;t contains age terms and also observed individual characteristics.
The age terms in qi;t capture variation on the individual's payo® from retirement according to
the age at which he or she retired. Such e®ects may arise either from the design of public early
retirement schemes or from rules tying ¯rm speci¯c or private pension payments to the age of
retirement.
Gross Wages
Gross wages are a central component of the model as the o®ered gross wage is a major determi-
nant of an individual's net income from full-time work. In the empirical analysis individual i's
log o®ered gross wage is assumed to evolve according to
log(wi;t) = ¸zzi;t + ¸®®iw + Ài;t for t = ¿i;:::;T: (6)
In the above zi;t are observed individual characteristics that a®ect wages including education,
region of residence and years of experience in the labor market. The coe±cient on experience
captures the e®ect of human capital accumulated via previous employment on wages. Ài;t is a
shock to individual i's wages occurring at time t and is assumed to be independent of observed
individual characteristics, to occur independently over time and to be normally distributed with
zero mean and a variance ¾2
À. Individual i is assumed to know the current value of Ài;t but does
not know the future values of the time varying shocks to wages. ®iw is a time invariant individual
speci¯c random e®ect assumed to be normally distributed with a mean that depends on the initial
conditions, and a variance ¾2
®w. After conditioning on the initial conditions, this random e®ect
is assumed to be independent of the random e®ect ®ie occurring in preferences. However, since
wages have an indirect e®ect on the preferences through net income, the persistent unobservables
a®ecting the utility of full-time employment relative to non-employment are correlated with the
persistent unobservables occurring in the wage equation.
Wages as observed by the econometrician are measured with error. Speci¯cally
log(wi;t)¤ = log(wi;t) + ´i;t for t = ¿i;:::;T; (7)
where log(wi;t)¤ represents the log gross wage observed by the econometrician and ´i;t is a
measurement error assumed to occur independently of the true wage and independently over
time. Furthermore, ´i;t is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and a variance
¾2
´.
3 The German Tax and Transfer System
In the following, we describe the key elements of the German tax and transfer system and how we
implement the legislation in the setting of a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply. Although
the general structure of income tax, social security contributions and transfers was unchanged
7over the years 1995 - 2006, several reforms, discussed in detail below, a®ected the progressivity
and generosity of this system. These reforms are important for this study as they provide an
additional, exogenous, source of identi¯cation, in particular for the coe±cient on net income.
Social Security Contributions (SSC)
In each month, an individual's income from employment is subject to social security deductions
for health, unemployment and pension bene¯ts.6 As shown in the ¯rst three columns of Table 1,
except for unemployment insurance, the rates for SSC increased slightly over time. Social
security contributions are capped, and the upper level of monthly earnings subject to SSC is
higher in west Germany than in the East (5200 Euros compared to 4500 Euros in 2005).7
Income Taxation
In contrast to SSC, income tax is computed on an annual basis and at the household level. Since
we focus only on single households, issues pertaining to the joint taxation of couples do not a®ect
our model. An individual's annual taxable income is de¯ned as the sum of gross income from
employment above an exemption threshold, gross income from assets above a disregard and
income from renting. Moreover SSC up to a maximum amount are deducted. An individual's
annual income tax liability is obtained by applying the income tax function to taxable income.
The income tax function is a smooth function of taxable income above a further exemption
threshold. The exemption threshold increased between 1995 and 2006 while, over the same
period, the top marginal tax rate decreased from 53% to 42% (see Table 1). In additional to
income tax, individuals pay an extra tax (Solidaritaetszuschlag) to ¯nance the cost of German
reuni¯cation. This extra tax was decreased in 1998 from 7.5% to 5.5% of income tax payments.
Transfer System
Conditional on an individual's employment and earnings history, a non-working individual may
receive unemployment insurance transfers. Additionally, depending on the level of any un-
employment insurance transfers and income from other sources, the individual may receive a
means-tested minimum income transfer, which includes a region speci¯c housing bene¯t. The
minimum income transfer does not depend on previous earnings and the transfer is permanent.
We simplify the legislation and approximate out-of-work transfers by only the means-tested
minimum income transfer. Given our sample selection criteria, unemployment insurance is rel-
atively unimportant so there is little loss in including only the means-tested minimum income
transfer. Speci¯cally, in the empirical analysis we include only individuals with low educational
quali¯cations. Such individuals tend to have low wages and therefore any unemployment in-
surance payments are wholly or mostly o®set by the withdraw of the means-tested minimum
income transfer. For two reasons, this approximation is most problematic for older individuals
with long working histories. First, wages, and therefore any unemployment insurance transfers,
6In addition to the employee's SSC, the employer contributes about the same amount in SSC.
7Low earning individuals pay SSC at a subsidized rate. However, since we only consider the full-time employed,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9are increasing with experience. Second, the entitlement rules for the unemployment insurance
are relatively generous for the older workers.8 Minimum income payments made to non-working
individuals are means-tested against capital income and income from renting. The last two
columns of Table 1 show the average monthly minimum income transfer paid to non-working
individuals for the years 1995 - 2006.
Working individuals with net incomes below the minimum income receive an in-work transfer
to raise their income to the minimum income. However as, in our model, all work consists of full-
time employment the majority of working individuals do not receive minimum income transfers.
In Germany, minimum income transfers are not subject to income taxation.
Implementation
As described above, income tax is based on annual income. However we model labor supply
decisions at quarterly intervals. In our implementation of the German tax and transfer system
we calculate net income in the current quarter based on an annualized version of the individual's
income in the current quarter. The procedure assumes implicitly that individuals base their labor
supply decision in the current quarter on their net income relating to their current gross income
and ignore any adjustments in taxes and transfer pertaining to income received previously in
the ¯scal year. Additionally we assume full take-up of bene¯ts.
4 Estimation Strategy
The parameters describing gross wages and preferences are estimated jointly using the Method
of Simulated Moments (MSM).9 Parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between a set of
moments pertaining to the values of the endogenous variables, namely wages, employment and
retirement outcomes, as observed in the sample and the average values of the same moments in
simulated data sets. The model contains 32 parameters and estimation is based on 48 moments
including the mean values of the endogenous variables and correlations between these variable
and the explanatory variables. The coe±cient on net income is identi¯ed from correlations
between functions of non-labor income and employment behavior. Changes in the tax and
transfer system over time provide a further source of identi¯cation. Speci¯cally, such changes
provide exogenous variation in the relationship between net income and employment, see Table 1
for changes in the tax and transfer system over time. The state speci¯c value functions, required
to simulate data sets, are approximated using an adaptation of the method of Keane and Wolpin
(1994).
Within the MSM framework it is straight forward to deal with missing wage observations.
8In an ongoing research project, Haan and Prowse (2009) distinguish between the di®erent transfer schemes for
the non-employed and model the endogeneity of entitlement to unemployment insurance payments in a life-cycle
model. This more complex model is informative about the e®ects of changes in the entitlement period of the
insurance based part of unemployment transfers. However such concerns are beyond the scope of this paper.
9In contrast Haan, Prowse, and Uhlendor® (2008) use a two-step procedure. This procedure reduced implicitly
the number of state variables in the model thus allowing the tax and transfer system to be modeled for more
complex household structures than considered in this paper. However, this method su®ers from the general
shortcomings of a two-step estimation procedure.
10Given the above model and the data source described below, there are three reasons for missing
wages. First, wages are observed only in one quarter of each year - the quarter in which the
interview was conducted - while the individual's employment state is observed in every quarter.
Second, only individuals in employment are asked to report their wage; the o®ered wage is not
observed for non-working individuals. Third, some individuals in employment do not respond to
all of the survey questions needed to construct the wage measure. The missing wage observations
in the quarters without interviews and the unobserved wages for non-working individuals do not
pose any particular di±culties when constructing the simulated data sets. In the estimation we
match moments of the wages observed in the sample with moments computed from the simulated
wages of individuals who, in the simulation, chose to work in the quarter in which they were
interviewed. This procedure does not require wages for non-interview quarters and accounts for
selection into employment based on both observed and unobserved individual characteristics.
To account for survey non-response, the moments pertaining to simulated wages are computed
by weighting the simulated wages according to observed socio-demographic variables. These
adjusted simulated moments are then matched to the corresponding moments in the sample.
This methodology accounts for survey non-response that varies according to observed socio-
demographic variables but assumes that, conditional on observables, survey non-response is
random.
5 Data and Descriptive Evidence
This study draws on data from the SOEP which is an annual representative panel survey of
over 11,000 households living in Germany and contains information about working behavior,
socio-economic variables and income information from all sources at the individual and house-
hold levels.10 We construct an unbalanced panel of single adult households with consecutive
observations in at least two years between 1996 - 2007 inclusive which yields retrospective in-
formation for the ¯scal years 1995 - 2006. The sample is restricted to singles aged between 40
and 65 years inclusive. The maximum level of school quali¯cations of individuals in our sample
is a medium degree (Realschule) and we drop individuals who have a higher vocational degree.
Further, we exclude individuals whose primary earnings are from self-employment as their labor
supply di®ers substantially from that of the rest of the population of interest. These exclusions
yield a sample with 867 di®erent single individuals, consisting of 489 women and 378 men. The
median number of observations per individual is 24 quarters.
The SOEP includes detailed information about employment and retirement behavior in each
month of the year prior to the interview date. For tractability, we group the monthly informa-
tion for each individual to form quarterly observations. More precisely, the individual's state in
the ¯rst month of the quarter determines the quarterly outcome. In this analysis we distinguish
between employment, assumed to be full-time work, non-employment and retirement. Individ-
uals aged 50 years or above who report su±cient income from a pension are classi¯ed as retired
10For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2005).










































































































































Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of the SOEP 1996-2007.
as are younger individuals with objective health problems who receive a large enough pension.11
Figure 1 shows the share of employment, non-employment and retirement by age separately
for men and women and by region. In general, the behavior of the various subgroups is similar.
Until the age of 55 years employment rates are fairly high while the employment rate declines to
zero over the last 10 years of the working life. Before age 55 years the majority of the non-work
corresponds to non-employment whereas retirement increases markedly after the age of 60 years.
Employment rates for men and women are quite similar. This is not surprising since our sample
consists only of single individuals without dependent children. A di®erence by gender only
becomes visible at the end of the working life. In particular, women tend to retire earlier than
men. By region however we ¯nd the expected strong di®erence: averaged over the whole age
distribution, the employment rate is 10 percentage points higher in west Germany than in east
Germany, and older east Germans have a higher propensity of retirement than west Germans
of the same age. These di®erences are likely to be related to the worse economic conditions in
east Germany.
In addition to the retrospective information on monthly employment states, the data includes
the gross earnings in the month prior to the interview date. Moreover, the corresponding
working hours including payed over-time work are given and thus we can construct an hourly
11The assumption that only individuals older than 50 years or with health problems can choose early retirement
is supported by the data.
12wage measure. For time-consistency we cannot use the retrospective employment information
and the current wage information from the same survey wave. Instead, we make use of the
panel dimension in the data. Since we observe the exact interview day we can match the wage
information collected in one year to the corresponding quarter of the retrospective employment
information collected the next year.
Given that our sample is very homogenous, we condition preferences and wages on only a
few demographic characteristics. Speci¯cally in addition to gender, education, nationality and
region of residence, which are time-invariant, we condition on age, time-varying health status and
experience. A measure of experience at the time the individual enters the sample is constructed
from retrospective information concerning the individual's working history. This variable is then
updated in accordance with the individual's observed employment behavior.
6 Results
Table 2 shows the estimates of the parameters of the equation describing log wages. All pa-
rameters are in line with previous ¯ndings. Gross wages are increasing in experience: we ¯nd
that an extra 10 years of experience increase the gross wage by 7%. We ¯nd quite large wage
di®erentials by gender, education, nationality and region of residence while there is no signi¯cant
e®ect of the health status. Ceteris paribus the gross wages of men are about 25% higher than for
women. The average e®ect of medium education, de¯ned as having a medium school degree or
vocational quali¯cation, is of a similar size. We ¯nd that for native Germans wages are roughly
30% higher and the wage di®erential between east and west Germany is on average about 50%.
As expected, variables that describe the initial conditions of employment have a strong impact
on wages. Moreover a large proportion on the unobserved component of log wages is due to per-
sistent unobservables. In contrast, the e®ect of classical measurement error is relatively small
and is not signi¯cant. The low measurement error we ¯nd is consistent with a well speci¯ed
wage equation. Similarly, the estimated variance of the time dependent individual error term is
small and insigni¯cant.
Tables 3 and 4 show, respectively, the estimates of the parameters that determine the °ow
utility from full-time employment, relative to non-employment, and the value function associ-
ated with retirement. In terms of the °ow utility from full-time employment, the coe±cient of
the indicator of being in employment in the previous quarter is highly signi¯cant. This state
dependence e®ect may be due to adjustment costs or habit formation. Age is a signi¯cant de-
terminant of preferences for full-time work only for individuals aged 59 years and above. As
mentioned above the approximation of the out-of work transfers is most problematic for the
older workers, since entitlement rules become more generous at the age of 60. Thus, the age
related preference e®ect might capture to some extent institutional regulations that provide in-
centives to use non-employment as a stepping stone into retirement (Haan and Prowse, 2009).
Interestingly we ¯nd that single men tend to have a lower preference for full-time work than sin-
gle women, although in the data we ¯nd on average a slightly higher employment rate for men.
This is related to the previously mentioned gender di®erential in o®ered gross wages. The higher








Health problems -0.028 0.045
Initial state 0.405 0.088




Note: West is an indicator of residing in west Germany, Education is a dummy for
having a medium school degree or vocational quali¯cation. Experience is measured
in years to the nearest quarter, German is an indicator of being a German national.
Health problems is an indicator or having some form a health problems that limit daily
activities. Initial state and Initial proportion are controls for the initial conditions.
Initial state is an indicator of being in full-time employment in the ¯rst quarter of
observation. Initial proportion is the proportion of the individual's working life spent
in employment as measured in the ¯rst quarter of observation.
work incentive for men are o®set by their lower preference for employment. The negative e®ect
of medium education can be explained in a similar way since o®ered wages for more educated
workers are higher. The e®ect of experience on the preference for employment is related to the
positive experience e®ect on wages and is found to be non signi¯cant. As expected individu-
als with health problems have a lower preference of full-time work relative to non-employment.
Lastly, the coe±cient on net income is signi¯cantly positive thus implying that net income is an
important determinant of labor supply behavior. The variables describing the initial condition
are not signi¯cant. Similarly, the standard deviation of individual unobserved e®ect ¾®e is only
weakly signi¯cant. However, as discussed above, the individual speci¯c unobservables in the
wages process a®ect the labor supply decision indirectly through the net income. The same is
true for the initial conditions variables.
The value function associated with retirement is increasing in experience and is higher for
individuals aged over 59 than for younger individuals. These e®ects are consistent with the
rules of both public and private pensions schemes. The size of pension depends crucially on the
working history which is measured by experience. Moreover there are fairly large penalties in
both public and private insurance plans if individuals claim their pension at earlier ages.
Figure 2 presents a graphical analysis of the model's goodness of ¯t. Employment, non-
employment and retirement are predicted satisfactorily. The distribution of the simulated log
wages for individuals in employment in the quarter in which they were interviewed and adjusted
for survey non-response, matches accurately the distribution of sampled wages.







Health problems -1.293 0.295
Education -0.495 0.258
Experience/10 -0.221 0.404
Initial state 0.602 0.848
Initial proportion 0.556 1.054
Coe±cient on net income (¯y) 3.337 1.307
¾®e 1.041 0.589
Note: Age1 and Age2 are age terms. Age1 is zero if the individuals is aged less than
54 years, increases in units of 0.25 per quarter between age 54 and age 59 and takes
the value 1 if the individual is aged 59 years or older. Age2 is zero if the individual is
aged less than 59 years and increases in units of 0.25 per quarter for individuals aged
over 59 years. See also the note for Table 2.




I(59 · Age < 63) 4.258 0.867
I(63 ¸ Age) 3.703 0.293
Male -0.233 0.854
Health problems 0.033 0.929
Education 0.898 1.047
Experience/10 1.051 0.342
Note: I() denotes and indicator function. See also the note for Table 2.
Further evidence concerning the model's goodness of ¯t is presented in Table 5 which shows
the empirical and simulated values of selected moments together the bootstrapped standard er-
rors. There is a close correspondence between the observed and simulated moments.12 However,
there is some tendency for simulated log wages to be more persistent than observed wages. For-
mally, the Â2 test statistic for the model ¯t rejects the null hypothesis of the validity of the 16
extra moment conditions. As shown in the last column of the table the bootstrapped standard
errors of the observed moments are very small which is due to the large sample size. Hence,
although the di®erence between the simulated and observed moments is fairly small in absolute
terms, according to the bootstrapped standard errors this di®erence is signi¯cant.
12The same is true of the other moments used for estimation but not presented in this table.
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g
Note: Simulation results based on 50 simulated data sets each of the same size as the
sample. Log wages are in year 2000 prices.
7 Life-cycle Employment E®ects of Tax Reforms
In the ¯nal section attention is turned to using the structural parameter estimates, reported
above, to simulate the e®ects of a reform to the system of taxation of earned income on individ-
uals' employment and retirement decision as they approach the age of compulsory retirement.
The German tax and transfer system can be characterized as a traditional welfare system
with relatively generous out-of-work transfers and high marginal deduction rates when people
start working. In the political discussion this has often been criticized and the low working
incentives have been identi¯ed as a central reason for high unemployment, particularly among
the low educated. Drawing on the international experience, mainly from EITC in the US and
the WTC in the UK, there is an ongoing debate about changing the German welfare system by
shifting more transfers to the working poor and thus increasing work incentives.
In the following we focus on one speci¯c, hypothetical, change to the tax system designed
to foster employment among low earning individuals. In contrast to recent reform proposals
which concentrate on the design of out-of-work transfers, we propose a reform which reduces
the marginal tax rate directly through a tax reduction for the working poor. Speci¯cally, we
consider the e®ect of a proportional reduction in taxable earnings for low income individuals.
The calibration of this policy is based on year 2000 prices and is such that individuals with a
gross hourly wage of less than 7.5 Euros per hour receive a 20% reduction on their taxable labor





mean(yi;f;t) 0.468 0.506 0.012
mean(yi;r;t) 0.293 0.274 0.013
sd(lnwi;t) 0.373 0.411 0.013
mean(lnwi;t) 0.146 0.093 0.025
corr(lnwi;t;lnwi;t¡4) 0.851 0.951 0.036
corr(lnwi;t;lnwi;t¡8) 0.869 0.950 0.026
corr(yi;f;t;yi;f;t¡1) 0.946 0.951 0.035
corr(yi;f;t;yi;f;t¡2) 0.898 0.909 0.065
corr(yi;r;t;yi;f;t¡1) -0.608 -0.635 0.017
sum(yi;f;t(1 ¡ yi;f;t¡1)) 268 239 15.301
sum((1 ¡ yi;f;t)yi;f;t¡1) 142 136 13.825
corr(lnwi;t;Westi;t) 0.412 0.351 0.045
corr(lnwi;t;Educationi;t) 0.049 0.027 0.060
corr(lnwi;t;Experiencei;t) 0.047 0.116 0.044
corr(lnwi;t;Malei;t) 0.186 0.144 0.054
corr(lnwi;t;Germani;t) 0.026 0.084 0.038
corr(lnwi;t;Health problemsi;t) -0.004 -0.007 0.043
Pct25(lnwi;t) -0.087 -0.188 0.045
Pct75(lnwi;t) 0.392 0.377 0.020
Â2 statistic 81.315 d.f.=16 p=0.000
Note: sd denotes standard deviation and Pctj(a) denotes the jth percentile of the
variable a. The bootstrapped standard errors are based on 500 bootstrapped samples
from the original data set.
earnings. Reductions of 15%, 10% and 5% are given to individuals whose gross hourly wage is,
respectively, between 7.5 Euros and 10 Euros, between 10 Euros and 12.5 Euros and between
12.5 Euros and 15 Euros. Individuals with a gross hourly wage higher than 15 Euros are not
a®ected by the policy change.
We consider two di®erent implementations of this tax reforms. The ¯rst is targeted at the
whole population and increases working incentives for low wage individuals of any age. In
the second implementation eligibility for the tax relief is conditioned on age. Speci¯cally, only
workers older than 59 years are eligible for the tax reduction. The age speci¯c reform has
the advantage that it is targeted at a population with low employment rates and thus limits
subsidies given to individuals who would choose employment without additional ¯scal incentives.
However, this change in income taxation for older workers induces dynamic e®ects over the life-
cycle. Indeed, for younger individuals not directly targeted by the age-related tax reduction it
might be optimal to adjust working behavior because of forward looking anticipation e®ects. A
priori the work incentives induced by such a tax reform are ambiguous. On the one hand higher
working experience increases the employment probability as well as gross wages at older ages
and this makes a tax reduction more attractive. On the other hand, since the tax reduction is
17conditional on hourly wages, it might be optimal for a younger worker to reduce employment,
leading to lower future wages, in order to become eligible for the tax subsidy. These examples
highlight the complexity of behavioral e®ects induced by ¯scal policy over the life-cycle, and
underline the importance of applying a dynamic life-cycle model which allows for adjustments
in current labor supply in response to anticipated future incentives.
Figure 3 shows the e®ects on employment, non-employment and retirement when the tax
reform is introduced for all individuals regardless of age.13 Panel (a) shows that averaged
across the whole population the policy leads to an increase in full-time work, of around 1.5
percentage point at most ages, and a similar sized reduction in non-employment. E®ects on
retirement decisions are negligible prior to age 60 while for individuals aged over 60 the policy
leads individuals to delay their retirement. The tax reform induces counteracting incentives
on the retirement behavior. Younger individuals might move earlier into retirement since the
increased employment leads to higher pensions. On the other hand it might be optimal to
postpone retirement in order to receive the subsidy for longer.
By de¯nition, the tax reform leads to di®erent behavioral responses for individuals with
di®erence observed characteristics. Since eligibility for the tax reduction is conditional on low
wages, individuals with low potential earnings have the highest incentive to take up or stay
longer in employment. Moreover, the size of the employment e®ect depends on the observed
employment shares of subgroups and is related to the estimated preference terms by observed and
unobserved characteristics discussed above. In the remaining panels in Figure 3 we present the
policy e®ects for selected subgroups of the population. Panels (b) shows e®ects for low educated,
east German women in good health while panel (c) shows the e®ects for the corresponding
group of men. The e®ects for men and women are of a similar magnitude and the only notable
di®erence is that for women there is a small decrease in retirement followed by an increase in
retirement, while retirement e®ects are always positive for men. Given the relatively minor
di®erence between men and women, further comparisons focus only on men. Across the other
subgroups we see larger e®ects on employment for the east German men with low education
than for the west German men with medium education. This is in line with the work incentives
provided by the tax reform. Being in poor health tends to reduce employment e®ects for low
educated east Germans and to increase retirement e®ects for medium educated west Germans.
Retirement e®ects are negative for medium educated west Germans, implying that the policy
leads to delayed retirement among members of this group, but is positive for all other groups.
Figure 4 shows that the employment e®ects di®er when the entitlement to the tax reduction
is conditioned on age. Unsurprisingly, the employment e®ects are largest for individuals aged
60 and above, who are directly a®ected by the policy reform. On average we ¯nd an increase
in employment of about 1 percentage point at around the age of 61 years. At the same time
retirement is postponed. The age related tax reform does not induce incentives to move earlier
into retirement as discussed above. By subgroups, we ¯nd the same di®erences as before. For
east Germans with low education and with good health employment rates increase around the
13Clarity of presentation, bootstrapped con¯dence intervals are omitted from the following ¯gures. The increase
in full-time employment is in general signi¯cantly for all subgroups up to age 62 years.
18Figure 3: Employment and retirement e®ects of a tax reform a®ecting all individuals: Sample
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Note: Simulations assume zero income from assets. When simulating the behavior for the
subgroups we assume that at age 40 all individuals are in employment and have 20 years of
experience.
19Figure 4: Employment and retirement e®ects of a tax reform a®ecting individuals aged years 60
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20age of 61 years by about 3 percentage points. The e®ects for the other subgroups are smaller,
and dramatically so for individuals with poor health.
As discussed above, the age speci¯c tax reform might induce behavioral e®ects for individuals
younger than 60 years, who are not a®ected directly by the tax reform. These e®ects are due to
anticipation e®ects which induce behavioral responses by younger individuals optimizing their
life-cycle labor supply. The results show that before the age of 57 years behavioral responses are
negligible. However at ages just before the policy change becomes e®ective, the employment rate
increases, on average by about half a percentage point. The size of this e®ect depends on several
features of the model, including the speci¯cation of intertemporal dependencies in preferences,
modeled here with experience and the lagged dependent variable, and the mechanism for human
capital accumulation, which here takes the form of years of previous employment. Additionally,
the magnitude of any anticipation e®ects is driven by the discount factor. We have assumed
individual to be forward looking with an annualized discount factor of 0.96. At the lower bound,
with myopic individuals (± = 0) the employment e®ect for the younger individuals would be zero.
The upper bound, with a discount factor of one, the behavioral responses of younger individuals
would certainly by higher.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed and estimated a dynamic structural life-cycle model of employ-
ment, non-employment and retirement that includes endogenous accumulation of human capital
and intertemporal non-separabilities in preferences. Additionally, and in contrast to most of the
previous literature, the model accounts for the e®ect of income taxation on work incentives. We
argue that such a model is required to represent accurately individuals' labor supply incentives
and to capture the various sources of dynamics in labor supply behavior.
Based on panel data from the SOEP we have estimated the parameters of a life-cycle model
for single adult households without dependent children. The model ¯ts the data well, including
¯tting accurately the distribution of wages, which are a key determinant of individuals' labor
supply decisions. In line with the previous literature, the estimation results show signi¯cant
dynamic e®ects which occur through both state dependent preferences and human capital accu-
mulation. Furthermore, we ¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect of net income on the employment decision,
which stresses the importance of a detailed modeling of the tax and transfer system.
The structural parameter estimates are used to evaluate the e®ects of a tax reform targeted
at low income working individuals on employment behavior and retirement decisions. We ¯nd
that a hypothetical change to the system of income tax which provides a proportionate reduction
in taxable income for low earning individuals leads a 1.5 percentage point increase in the rate
of full-time employment. Due to its focus on low earning individuals, the e®ect of this policy is
larger for low educated than for medium educated individuals. Additionally, there is evidence
of interactions between income taxation and retirement decisions. Averaged over the whole
sample, there is a reduction in retirement implying that the cut in income tax for low earning
individuals causes a delay in movements into early retirement. It is therefore the case that, on
21average, the direct incentive created by the policy to move into employment outweighs the e®ect
of greater pension entitlement due to more experience. We have also considered the labor market
implications of conditioning the reduction in income tax on age, such that only individuals aged
60 years and above are eligible to receive the tax rebate. In this case, the policy leads to a large
positive employment e®ect and a reduction in retirements among those aged 60 years and above.
Also, due to the forward looking nature of individuals' labor supply decisions, individuals aged
under 60 years, who are not a®ected directly by the policy, ¯nd it optimal to adjust their labor
supply behavior. Speci¯cally, for individuals aged 57-60 years we ¯nd an increase in full-time
employment and a reduction in non-employment.
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